1860 lines
52 KiB
C
1860 lines
52 KiB
C
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/* ssl/t1_lib.c */
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/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
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* All rights reserved.
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*
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* This package is an SSL implementation written
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* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
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* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
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*
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* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
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* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
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* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
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* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
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* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
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* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
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*
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* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
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* the code are not to be removed.
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* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
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* as the author of the parts of the library used.
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* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
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* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
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* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
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* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
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* must display the following acknowledgement:
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* "This product includes cryptographic software written by
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* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
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* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
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* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
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* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
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* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
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* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
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* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
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* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
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* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
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* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
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* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
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* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
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* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
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* SUCH DAMAGE.
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*
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* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
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* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
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* copied and put under another distribution licence
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* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
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*/
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/* ====================================================================
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* Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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*
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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*
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
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* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
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* distribution.
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*
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* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
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* software must display the following acknowledgment:
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* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
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* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
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*
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* 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
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* endorse or promote products derived from this software without
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* prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
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* openssl-core@openssl.org.
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*
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* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
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* nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
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* permission of the OpenSSL Project.
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*
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* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
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* acknowledgment:
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* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
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* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
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* EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
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* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
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* ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
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* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
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* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
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* LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
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* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
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* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
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* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
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* ====================================================================
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*
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* This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
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* (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
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* Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
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*
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*/
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include <openssl/objects.h>
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#include <openssl/evp.h>
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#include <openssl/hmac.h>
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#include <openssl/ocsp.h>
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#include "ssl_locl.h"
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const char tls1_version_str[]="TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
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static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
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const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
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SSL_SESSION **psess);
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#endif
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SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data={
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tls1_enc,
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tls1_mac,
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tls1_setup_key_block,
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tls1_generate_master_secret,
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tls1_change_cipher_state,
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tls1_final_finish_mac,
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TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
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tls1_cert_verify_mac,
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TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
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TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
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tls1_alert_code,
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};
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long tls1_default_timeout(void)
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{
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/* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec
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* is way too long for http, the cache would over fill */
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return(60*60*2);
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}
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int tls1_new(SSL *s)
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{
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if (!ssl3_new(s)) return(0);
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s->method->ssl_clear(s);
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return(1);
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}
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void tls1_free(SSL *s)
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{
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
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if (s->tlsext_session_ticket)
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{
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OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
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}
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#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
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ssl3_free(s);
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}
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void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
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{
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ssl3_clear(s);
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s->version=TLS1_VERSION;
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}
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
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static int nid_list[] =
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{
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NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
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NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */
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NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */
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NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */
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NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */
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NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */
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NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */
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NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */
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NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
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NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */
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NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */
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NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */
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NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */
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NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */
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NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */
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NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */
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NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */
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NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */
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NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */
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NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */
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NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */
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NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */
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NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */
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NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
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NID_secp521r1 /* secp521r1 (25) */
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};
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int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
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{
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/* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
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if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
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sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
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return 0;
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return nid_list[curve_id-1];
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}
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int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
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{
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/* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
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switch (nid)
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{
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case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
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return 1;
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case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
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return 2;
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case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
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return 3;
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case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
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return 4;
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case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
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return 5;
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case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
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return 6;
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case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
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return 7;
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case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
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return 8;
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case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
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return 9;
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case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
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return 10;
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case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
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return 11;
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case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
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return 12;
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case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
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return 13;
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case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
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return 14;
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case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
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return 15;
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case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
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return 16;
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case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
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return 17;
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case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
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return 18;
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case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
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return 19;
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case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
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return 20;
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case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
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return 21;
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case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
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return 22;
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case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
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return 23;
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case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
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return 24;
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case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
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return 25;
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default:
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return 0;
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}
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}
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#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
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unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
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{
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int extdatalen=0;
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unsigned char *ret = p;
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/* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */
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if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION
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&& !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
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return p;
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ret+=2;
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if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
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if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
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{
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/* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
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unsigned long size_str;
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long lenmax;
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/* check for enough space.
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4 for the servername type and entension length
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2 for servernamelist length
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1 for the hostname type
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2 for hostname length
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+ hostname length
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*/
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if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
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|| (size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
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return NULL;
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/* extension type and length */
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s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
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s2n(size_str+5,ret);
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/* length of servername list */
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s2n(size_str+3,ret);
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/* hostname type, length and hostname */
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*(ret++) = (unsigned char) TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
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s2n(size_str,ret);
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memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
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ret+=size_str;
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}
|
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|
|
||
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/* Add RI if renegotiating */
|
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if (s->new_session)
|
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{
|
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int el;
|
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|
|
||
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if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
|
||
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{
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SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
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return NULL;
|
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|
}
|
||
|
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||
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if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
|
||
|
|
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s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
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s2n(el,ret);
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|
|
||
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if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
|
||
|
{
|
||
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SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
||
|
return NULL;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
ret += el;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
|
||
|
if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL &&
|
||
|
s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
/* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
|
||
|
long lenmax;
|
||
|
|
||
|
if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
|
||
|
if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL;
|
||
|
if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 255)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
||
|
return NULL;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
|
||
|
s2n(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length + 1,ret);
|
||
|
*(ret++) = (unsigned char) s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
|
||
|
memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
|
||
|
ret+=s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL &&
|
||
|
s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
/* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */
|
||
|
long lenmax;
|
||
|
|
||
|
if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL;
|
||
|
if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL;
|
||
|
if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length > 65532)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
||
|
return NULL;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves,ret);
|
||
|
s2n(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length + 2, ret);
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* NB: draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt uses a one-byte prefix for
|
||
|
* elliptic_curve_list, but the examples use two bytes.
|
||
|
* http://www1.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg00538.html
|
||
|
* resolves this to two bytes.
|
||
|
*/
|
||
|
s2n(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length, ret);
|
||
|
memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
|
||
|
ret+=s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
int ticklen;
|
||
|
if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
|
||
|
ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
|
||
|
else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
|
||
|
s->tlsext_session_ticket->data)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
|
||
|
s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
|
||
|
if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
|
||
|
return NULL;
|
||
|
memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
|
||
|
s->tlsext_session_ticket->data,
|
||
|
ticklen);
|
||
|
s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
else
|
||
|
ticklen = 0;
|
||
|
if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
|
||
|
s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
|
||
|
goto skip_ext;
|
||
|
/* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len
|
||
|
* rest for ticket
|
||
|
*/
|
||
|
if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) return NULL;
|
||
|
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
|
||
|
s2n(ticklen,ret);
|
||
|
if (ticklen)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
|
||
|
ret += ticklen;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
skip_ext:
|
||
|
|
||
|
#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
|
||
|
if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
|
||
|
s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
|
||
|
|
||
|
if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col < 0))
|
||
|
return NULL;
|
||
|
if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
|
||
|
return NULL;
|
||
|
|
||
|
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
|
||
|
s2n(col + 2, ret);
|
||
|
s2n(col, ret);
|
||
|
memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col);
|
||
|
ret += col;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
#endif
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp &&
|
||
|
s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
int i;
|
||
|
long extlen, idlen, itmp;
|
||
|
OCSP_RESPID *id;
|
||
|
|
||
|
idlen = 0;
|
||
|
for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
|
||
|
itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
|
||
|
if (itmp <= 0)
|
||
|
return NULL;
|
||
|
idlen += itmp + 2;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
|
||
|
if (extlen < 0)
|
||
|
return NULL;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
else
|
||
|
extlen = 0;
|
||
|
|
||
|
if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) return NULL;
|
||
|
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
|
||
|
if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
|
||
|
return NULL;
|
||
|
s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
|
||
|
*(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
|
||
|
s2n(idlen, ret);
|
||
|
for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
/* save position of id len */
|
||
|
unsigned char *q = ret;
|
||
|
id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
|
||
|
/* skip over id len */
|
||
|
ret += 2;
|
||
|
itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
|
||
|
/* write id len */
|
||
|
s2n(itmp, q);
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
s2n(extlen, ret);
|
||
|
if (extlen > 0)
|
||
|
i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
|
||
|
if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
/* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its
|
||
|
* support for Next Protocol Negotiation */
|
||
|
if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
|
||
|
return NULL;
|
||
|
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
|
||
|
s2n(0,ret);
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
#endif
|
||
|
|
||
|
if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0)
|
||
|
return p;
|
||
|
|
||
|
s2n(extdatalen,p);
|
||
|
return ret;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
int extdatalen=0;
|
||
|
unsigned char *ret = p;
|
||
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
|
||
|
int next_proto_neg_seen;
|
||
|
#endif
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */
|
||
|
if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
|
||
|
return p;
|
||
|
|
||
|
ret+=2;
|
||
|
if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
|
||
|
|
||
|
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
|
||
|
s2n(0,ret);
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
if(s->s3->send_connection_binding)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
int el;
|
||
|
|
||
|
if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
||
|
return NULL;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
|
||
|
|
||
|
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
|
||
|
s2n(el,ret);
|
||
|
|
||
|
if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
||
|
return NULL;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
ret += el;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
|
||
|
if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL &&
|
||
|
s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
/* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */
|
||
|
long lenmax;
|
||
|
|
||
|
if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
|
||
|
if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL;
|
||
|
if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 255)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
||
|
return NULL;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
|
||
|
s2n(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length + 1,ret);
|
||
|
*(ret++) = (unsigned char) s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
|
||
|
memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
|
||
|
ret+=s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
|
||
|
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
/* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves extension */
|
||
|
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected
|
||
|
&& !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
|
||
|
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
|
||
|
s2n(0,ret);
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
|
||
|
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,ret);
|
||
|
s2n(0,ret);
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
|
||
|
if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
|
||
|
s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
|
||
|
|
||
|
if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0)
|
||
|
return NULL;
|
||
|
if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
|
||
|
return NULL;
|
||
|
|
||
|
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
|
||
|
s2n(sol + 2, ret);
|
||
|
s2n(sol, ret);
|
||
|
memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol);
|
||
|
ret += sol;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
#endif
|
||
|
if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x80 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x81)
|
||
|
&& (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG))
|
||
|
{ const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
|
||
|
0xfd, 0xe8, /*65000*/
|
||
|
0x00, 0x20, /*32 bytes length*/
|
||
|
0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
|
||
|
0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
|
||
|
0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
|
||
|
0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17};
|
||
|
if (limit-ret<36) return NULL;
|
||
|
memcpy(ret,cryptopro_ext,36);
|
||
|
ret+=36;
|
||
|
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
|
||
|
next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
|
||
|
s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
|
||
|
if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
const unsigned char *npa;
|
||
|
unsigned int npalen;
|
||
|
int r;
|
||
|
|
||
|
r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
|
||
|
if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) return NULL;
|
||
|
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
|
||
|
s2n(npalen,ret);
|
||
|
memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
|
||
|
ret += npalen;
|
||
|
s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
#endif
|
||
|
|
||
|
if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0)
|
||
|
return p;
|
||
|
|
||
|
s2n(extdatalen,p);
|
||
|
return ret;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
unsigned short type;
|
||
|
unsigned short size;
|
||
|
unsigned short len;
|
||
|
unsigned char *data = *p;
|
||
|
int renegotiate_seen = 0;
|
||
|
|
||
|
s->servername_done = 0;
|
||
|
s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (data >= (d+n-2))
|
||
|
goto ri_check;
|
||
|
n2s(data,len);
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (data > (d+n-len))
|
||
|
goto ri_check;
|
||
|
|
||
|
while (data <= (d+n-4))
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
n2s(data,type);
|
||
|
n2s(data,size);
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (data+size > (d+n))
|
||
|
goto ri_check;
|
||
|
#if 0
|
||
|
fprintf(stderr,"Received extension type %d size %d\n",type,size);
|
||
|
#endif
|
||
|
if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
|
||
|
s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size,
|
||
|
s->tlsext_debug_arg);
|
||
|
/* The servername extension is treated as follows:
|
||
|
|
||
|
- Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
|
||
|
- The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
|
||
|
in which case an fatal alert is generated.
|
||
|
- The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
|
||
|
- When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
|
||
|
to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
|
||
|
- The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
|
||
|
it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
|
||
|
Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
|
||
|
set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
|
||
|
case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
|
||
|
a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
|
||
|
presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
|
||
|
the value of the Host: field.
|
||
|
- Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
|
||
|
if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the session,
|
||
|
i.e. when the session has been established with a servername extension.
|
||
|
- On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
|
||
|
|
||
|
*/
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
unsigned char *sdata;
|
||
|
int servname_type;
|
||
|
int dsize;
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (size < 2)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
n2s(data,dsize);
|
||
|
size -= 2;
|
||
|
if (dsize > size )
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
sdata = data;
|
||
|
while (dsize > 3)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
servname_type = *(sdata++);
|
||
|
n2s(sdata,len);
|
||
|
dsize -= 3;
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (len > dsize)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
if (s->servername_done == 0)
|
||
|
switch (servname_type)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
|
||
|
if (!s->hit)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
if(s->session->tlsext_hostname)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
*al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
|
||
|
s->session->tlsext_hostname[len]='\0';
|
||
|
if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
|
||
|
OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
|
||
|
s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
|
||
|
*al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
s->servername_done = 1;
|
||
|
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
else
|
||
|
s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
|
||
|
&& strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
|
||
|
&& strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
|
||
|
|
||
|
break;
|
||
|
|
||
|
default:
|
||
|
break;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
dsize -= len;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
if (dsize != 0)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
|
||
|
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats &&
|
||
|
s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
unsigned char *sdata = data;
|
||
|
int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
*al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
if (!s->hit)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
if(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
|
||
|
s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
|
||
|
if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
|
||
|
memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
#if 0
|
||
|
fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
|
||
|
sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
|
||
|
for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
|
||
|
fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
|
||
|
fprintf(stderr,"\n");
|
||
|
#endif
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves &&
|
||
|
s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
unsigned char *sdata = data;
|
||
|
int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
|
||
|
ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
*al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
if (!s->hit)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
if(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
*al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
|
||
|
if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = ellipticcurvelist_length;
|
||
|
memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, ellipticcurvelist_length);
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
#if 0
|
||
|
fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
|
||
|
sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
|
||
|
for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++)
|
||
|
fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
|
||
|
fprintf(stderr,"\n");
|
||
|
#endif
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
|
||
|
#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
|
||
|
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input &&
|
||
|
s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
unsigned char *sdata = data;
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (size < 2)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
|
||
|
if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
|
||
|
OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
|
||
|
if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
|
||
|
s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
|
||
|
else
|
||
|
s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
|
||
|
if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
#endif
|
||
|
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
|
||
|
!s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
if(!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
renegotiate_seen = 1;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
|
||
|
s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (size < 5)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
|
||
|
size--;
|
||
|
if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
const unsigned char *sdata;
|
||
|
int dsize;
|
||
|
/* Read in responder_id_list */
|
||
|
n2s(data,dsize);
|
||
|
size -= 2;
|
||
|
if (dsize > size )
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
while (dsize > 0)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
OCSP_RESPID *id;
|
||
|
int idsize;
|
||
|
if (dsize < 4)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
n2s(data, idsize);
|
||
|
dsize -= 2 + idsize;
|
||
|
size -= 2 + idsize;
|
||
|
if (dsize < 0)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
sdata = data;
|
||
|
data += idsize;
|
||
|
id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL,
|
||
|
&sdata, idsize);
|
||
|
if (!id)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
if (data != sdata)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
|
||
|
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
|
||
|
&& !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
|
||
|
sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null()))
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
|
||
|
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(
|
||
|
s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id))
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
|
||
|
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* Read in request_extensions */
|
||
|
if (size < 2)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
n2s(data,dsize);
|
||
|
size -= 2;
|
||
|
if (dsize != size)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
sdata = data;
|
||
|
if (dsize > 0)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
|
||
|
d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL,
|
||
|
&sdata, dsize);
|
||
|
if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts
|
||
|
|| (data + dsize != sdata))
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
/* We don't know what to do with any other type
|
||
|
* so ignore it.
|
||
|
*/
|
||
|
else
|
||
|
s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
|
||
|
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
|
||
|
s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
/* We shouldn't accept this extension on a
|
||
|
* renegotiation.
|
||
|
*
|
||
|
* s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
|
||
|
* probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
|
||
|
* the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
|
||
|
* there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
|
||
|
* earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
|
||
|
* anything like that, but this might change).
|
||
|
|
||
|
* A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
|
||
|
* in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
|
||
|
* 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
|
||
|
* in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
|
||
|
* Finished message could have been computed.) */
|
||
|
s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
#endif
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* session ticket processed earlier */
|
||
|
data+=size;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
*p = data;
|
||
|
|
||
|
ri_check:
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* Need RI if renegotiating */
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (!renegotiate_seen && s->new_session &&
|
||
|
!(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
*al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
|
||
|
SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
return 1;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
|
||
|
/* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
|
||
|
* elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly fill
|
||
|
* the length of the block. */
|
||
|
static int ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
unsigned int off = 0;
|
||
|
|
||
|
while (off < len)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
if (d[off] == 0)
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
off += d[off];
|
||
|
off++;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
return off == len;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
#endif
|
||
|
|
||
|
int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
unsigned short length;
|
||
|
unsigned short type;
|
||
|
unsigned short size;
|
||
|
unsigned char *data = *p;
|
||
|
int tlsext_servername = 0;
|
||
|
int renegotiate_seen = 0;
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (data >= (d+n-2))
|
||
|
goto ri_check;
|
||
|
|
||
|
n2s(data,length);
|
||
|
if (data+length != d+n)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
while(data <= (d+n-4))
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
n2s(data,type);
|
||
|
n2s(data,size);
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (data+size > (d+n))
|
||
|
goto ri_check;
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
|
||
|
s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size,
|
||
|
s->tlsext_debug_arg);
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
*al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
tlsext_servername = 1;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
|
||
|
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats &&
|
||
|
s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
unsigned char *sdata = data;
|
||
|
int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
*al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
|
||
|
if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
|
||
|
if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
|
||
|
memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
|
||
|
#if 0
|
||
|
fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
|
||
|
sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
|
||
|
for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
|
||
|
fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
|
||
|
fprintf(stderr,"\n");
|
||
|
#endif
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
|
||
|
|
||
|
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
|
||
|
!s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
|
||
|
|| (size > 0))
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
*al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
|
||
|
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input &&
|
||
|
s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
unsigned char *sdata = data;
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (size < 2)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
|
||
|
if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
|
||
|
OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
|
||
|
if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
|
||
|
s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
|
||
|
else
|
||
|
s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
#endif
|
||
|
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
|
||
|
s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
/* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested
|
||
|
* a status request message.
|
||
|
*/
|
||
|
if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0))
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
*al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
/* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
|
||
|
s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
|
||
|
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
unsigned char *selected;
|
||
|
unsigned char selected_len;
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* We must have requested it. */
|
||
|
if ((s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL))
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
*al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
/* The data must be valid */
|
||
|
if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size))
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
*al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, size, s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
|
||
|
if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
|
||
|
s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
#endif
|
||
|
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
renegotiate_seen = 1;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
data+=size;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (data != d+n)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
if (s->tlsext_hostname)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
|
||
|
if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
*al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
else
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
*p = data;
|
||
|
|
||
|
ri_check:
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to
|
||
|
* avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server
|
||
|
* hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an
|
||
|
* attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server
|
||
|
* which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI
|
||
|
* absence on initial connect only.
|
||
|
*/
|
||
|
if (!renegotiate_seen
|
||
|
&& !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
|
||
|
&& !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
*al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
|
||
|
SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
return 1;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
|
||
|
/* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher suite, send the point formats
|
||
|
* and elliptic curves we support.
|
||
|
*/
|
||
|
int using_ecc = 0;
|
||
|
int i;
|
||
|
unsigned char *j;
|
||
|
unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
|
||
|
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
|
||
|
|
||
|
for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
|
||
|
|
||
|
alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
|
||
|
alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
|
||
|
if ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
using_ecc = 1;
|
||
|
break;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->version == TLS1_VERSION);
|
||
|
if (using_ecc)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
|
||
|
if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(3)) == NULL)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
||
|
return -1;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 3;
|
||
|
s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[0] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
|
||
|
s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[1] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
|
||
|
s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[2] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* we support all named elliptic curves in draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12 */
|
||
|
if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist);
|
||
|
s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0]) * 2;
|
||
|
if ((s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
||
|
return -1;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
for (i = 1, j = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; (unsigned int)i <=
|
||
|
sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0]); i++)
|
||
|
s2n(i,j);
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
|
||
|
|
||
|
#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
int r = 1;
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
|
||
|
if (!r)
|
||
|
return -1;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
|
||
|
OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
|
||
|
s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
|
||
|
else
|
||
|
s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
|
||
|
if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
||
|
return -1;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (r == 2)
|
||
|
/* at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate server opaque PRF input */
|
||
|
s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
#endif
|
||
|
|
||
|
return 1;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
|
||
|
/* If we are server and using an ECC cipher suite, send the point formats we support
|
||
|
* if the client sent us an ECPointsFormat extension. Note that the server is not
|
||
|
* supposed to send an EllipticCurves extension.
|
||
|
*/
|
||
|
|
||
|
unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
|
||
|
unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
|
||
|
int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
|
||
|
using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (using_ecc)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
|
||
|
if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(3)) == NULL)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
||
|
return -1;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 3;
|
||
|
s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[0] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
|
||
|
s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[1] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
|
||
|
s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[2] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
|
||
|
|
||
|
return 1;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
|
||
|
int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
|
||
|
|
||
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
|
||
|
/* The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely in
|
||
|
* ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
|
||
|
*/
|
||
|
/* The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely in
|
||
|
* ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
|
||
|
*/
|
||
|
#endif
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
|
||
|
ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
|
||
|
else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
|
||
|
ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* If status request then ask callback what to do.
|
||
|
* Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case
|
||
|
* the certificate has changed.
|
||
|
*/
|
||
|
if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
int r;
|
||
|
r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
|
||
|
switch (r)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
/* We don't want to send a status request response */
|
||
|
case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
|
||
|
s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
|
||
|
break;
|
||
|
/* status request response should be sent */
|
||
|
case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
|
||
|
if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
|
||
|
s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
|
||
|
else
|
||
|
s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
|
||
|
break;
|
||
|
/* something bad happened */
|
||
|
case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
|
||
|
ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
|
||
|
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
||
|
goto err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
else
|
||
|
s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
|
||
|
|
||
|
#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
/* This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(),
|
||
|
* but we might be sending an alert in response to the client hello,
|
||
|
* so this has to happen here in ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(). */
|
||
|
|
||
|
int r = 1;
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
|
||
|
if (!r)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
|
||
|
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
||
|
goto err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
|
||
|
OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
|
||
|
s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL;
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
|
||
|
s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
/* can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF input
|
||
|
* of the same length as the client opaque PRF input! */
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
|
||
|
s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
|
||
|
else
|
||
|
s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
|
||
|
if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
|
||
|
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
||
|
goto err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
/* The callback wants to enforce use of the extension,
|
||
|
* but we can't do that with the client opaque PRF input;
|
||
|
* abort the handshake.
|
||
|
*/
|
||
|
ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
|
||
|
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
#endif
|
||
|
err:
|
||
|
switch (ret)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
|
||
|
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
|
||
|
return -1;
|
||
|
|
||
|
case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
|
||
|
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
|
||
|
return 1;
|
||
|
|
||
|
case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
|
||
|
s->servername_done=0;
|
||
|
default:
|
||
|
return 1;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
|
||
|
int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
|
||
|
|
||
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
|
||
|
/* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
|
||
|
* suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension
|
||
|
* it must contain uncompressed.
|
||
|
*/
|
||
|
unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
|
||
|
unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
|
||
|
if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
|
||
|
(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
|
||
|
((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
/* we are using an ECC cipher */
|
||
|
size_t i;
|
||
|
unsigned char *list;
|
||
|
int found_uncompressed = 0;
|
||
|
list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
|
||
|
for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
found_uncompressed = 1;
|
||
|
break;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
if (!found_uncompressed)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
|
||
|
return -1;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
|
||
|
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
|
||
|
ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
|
||
|
else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
|
||
|
ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
|
||
|
|
||
|
#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
|
||
|
if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
/* This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on using opaque PRF inputs.
|
||
|
* So first verify that we really have a value from the server too. */
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
|
||
|
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to check
|
||
|
* that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size. */
|
||
|
if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL ||
|
||
|
s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
|
||
|
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
#endif
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one
|
||
|
* tell the callback
|
||
|
*/
|
||
|
if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
|
||
|
&& s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
int r;
|
||
|
/* Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows
|
||
|
* there is no response.
|
||
|
*/
|
||
|
if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
|
||
|
s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
|
||
|
r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
|
||
|
if (r == 0)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
|
||
|
ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
if (r < 0)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
||
|
ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
switch (ret)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
|
||
|
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
|
||
|
return -1;
|
||
|
|
||
|
case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
|
||
|
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
|
||
|
return 1;
|
||
|
|
||
|
case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
|
||
|
s->servername_done=0;
|
||
|
default:
|
||
|
return 1;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of client
|
||
|
* hello and other operations depend on the result we need to handle any TLS
|
||
|
* session ticket extension at the same time.
|
||
|
*/
|
||
|
|
||
|
int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
|
||
|
const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
/* Point after session ID in client hello */
|
||
|
const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
|
||
|
unsigned short i;
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present
|
||
|
* to permit stateful resumption.
|
||
|
*/
|
||
|
if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
|
||
|
return 1;
|
||
|
|
||
|
if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
|
||
|
return 1;
|
||
|
if (p >= limit)
|
||
|
return -1;
|
||
|
/* Skip past DTLS cookie */
|
||
|
if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
i = *(p++);
|
||
|
p+= i;
|
||
|
if (p >= limit)
|
||
|
return -1;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
/* Skip past cipher list */
|
||
|
n2s(p, i);
|
||
|
p+= i;
|
||
|
if (p >= limit)
|
||
|
return -1;
|
||
|
/* Skip past compression algorithm list */
|
||
|
i = *(p++);
|
||
|
p += i;
|
||
|
if (p > limit)
|
||
|
return -1;
|
||
|
/* Now at start of extensions */
|
||
|
if ((p + 2) >= limit)
|
||
|
return 1;
|
||
|
n2s(p, i);
|
||
|
while ((p + 4) <= limit)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
unsigned short type, size;
|
||
|
n2s(p, type);
|
||
|
n2s(p, size);
|
||
|
if (p + size > limit)
|
||
|
return 1;
|
||
|
if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
/* If tickets disabled indicate cache miss which will
|
||
|
* trigger a full handshake
|
||
|
*/
|
||
|
if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
|
||
|
return 1;
|
||
|
/* If zero length note client will accept a ticket
|
||
|
* and indicate cache miss to trigger full handshake
|
||
|
*/
|
||
|
if (size == 0)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
|
||
|
return 0; /* Cache miss */
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
if (s->tls_session_secret_cb)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
/* Indicate cache miss here and instead of
|
||
|
* generating the session from ticket now,
|
||
|
* trigger abbreviated handshake based on
|
||
|
* external mechanism to calculate the master
|
||
|
* secret later. */
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
return tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len,
|
||
|
ret);
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
p += size;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
return 1;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
|
||
|
const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
|
||
|
SSL_SESSION **psess)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
SSL_SESSION *sess;
|
||
|
unsigned char *sdec;
|
||
|
const unsigned char *p;
|
||
|
int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
|
||
|
unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
|
||
|
HMAC_CTX hctx;
|
||
|
EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
|
||
|
SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
|
||
|
/* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
|
||
|
if (eticklen < 48)
|
||
|
goto tickerr;
|
||
|
/* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
|
||
|
HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
|
||
|
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
|
||
|
if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
|
||
|
int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
|
||
|
&ctx, &hctx, 0);
|
||
|
if (rv < 0)
|
||
|
return -1;
|
||
|
if (rv == 0)
|
||
|
goto tickerr;
|
||
|
if (rv == 2)
|
||
|
renew_ticket = 1;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
else
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
/* Check key name matches */
|
||
|
if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
|
||
|
goto tickerr;
|
||
|
HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
|
||
|
tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
|
||
|
EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
|
||
|
tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
/* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and
|
||
|
* integrity checks on ticket.
|
||
|
*/
|
||
|
mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
|
||
|
if (mlen < 0)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
|
||
|
return -1;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
eticklen -= mlen;
|
||
|
/* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
|
||
|
HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
|
||
|
HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
|
||
|
HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
|
||
|
if (memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
|
||
|
goto tickerr;
|
||
|
/* Attempt to decrypt session data */
|
||
|
/* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
|
||
|
p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
|
||
|
eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
|
||
|
sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
|
||
|
if (!sdec)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
|
||
|
return -1;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
|
||
|
if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0)
|
||
|
goto tickerr;
|
||
|
slen += mlen;
|
||
|
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
|
||
|
p = sdec;
|
||
|
|
||
|
sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
|
||
|
OPENSSL_free(sdec);
|
||
|
if (sess)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
/* The session ID if non-empty is used by some clients to
|
||
|
* detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to
|
||
|
* the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero
|
||
|
* as required by standard.
|
||
|
*/
|
||
|
if (sesslen)
|
||
|
memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
|
||
|
sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
|
||
|
*psess = sess;
|
||
|
s->tlsext_ticket_expected = renew_ticket;
|
||
|
return 1;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
/* If session decrypt failure indicate a cache miss and set state to
|
||
|
* send a new ticket
|
||
|
*/
|
||
|
tickerr:
|
||
|
s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
#endif
|